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Abstract
Generally, implementation of Pigovian taxes to correct for market failure requires an enormous set of
information. For each commodity-person combination a di⁄erent tax is required to correct the resulting
market ine¢ ciency. In this paper, we analyse interdependent preferences and ine¢ ciency of the market
solution with the aim of ￿nding conditions justifying simple rules for such taxes. We examine the utility
possibility curve and Scitovsky community indi⁄erence curve, allowing for general utility interdependence
and agent heterogeneity. In particular we show the equivalence of taxes derived from the Marshallian and
compensated demand approaches. We move on to analyse the welfare cost of consumption externalities
and show that it decomposes into part due to individuals choosing suboptimal quantities and part due to
individuals using valuations that are not socially optimal. We show what forms of externality can justify
simple policy corrections. In particular, we analyse the conditions which are required for the market
failure to be corrected by: 1) speci￿c indirect ad valorem taxes on commodities, 2) the same proportional
tax rate on every commodity, 3) a proportional income tax rate on each individual. The conditions are
related to the restrictions necessary to have H synthetic consumers without externalities who replicate
behaviour of individuals with externalities. An example with two individuals and three goods concludes
the paper.
Keywords: Consumption externalities, Piecemeal policy.
JEL classi￿cation: D62, D11.
1 Introduction
Usually some taxation method is suggested for the correction of externalities. These ideas are based on
Pigovian transfers and Lindahl pricing in which the taxes serve to replace private marginal rates of substitu-
tion by social marginal rates of substitution (Lindahl (1919), Bergstrom (1970), Milleron (1972), ). However
in general di⁄erent commodity and person speci￿c taxes are necessary in each market and the appropriate
tax rate depends on the particular Pareto optimal allocation of commodities which is under consideration.
The tax authority needs full information on preferences and technology to implement Pigovian taxes, Lindahl
distributive mechanisms do not require this but require restricted forms of externality to be able to achieve
e¢ ciency (Bergstrom (1977), Tian (2004)).
Hence there is interest in ￿nding conditions under which simple taxes can be used. In reality we have a
mixture of personal income taxation, general sales taxes at a more or less uniform rate (VAT) and speci￿c
commodity indirect taxes e.g. on alcohol and tobacco. Because these tax rates are not di⁄erentiated by
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1personal spending patterns, they are feasible to administer. Some research tries to de￿ne conditions under
which piecemeal policy is possible, in which the appropriate correction in one market is independent of
activity in other markets. There is some looseness in this idea-for example if only one market is subject to
externalities, it means that taxation is directed only to transactions in that market. If several markets are
subject to consumption externalities it might mean that the taxes necessary to restore Pareto optimality in
one market are una⁄ected by exogenous shocks in other markets e.g. supply shocks. In the context of a
distorted sector in which consumer and producer prices di⁄er, Jewitt (1981) and Blackorby, Donaldson &
Schworm (1991) ￿nd that piecemeal policy is only justi￿ed if the set of e¢ cient points can be described by
a relation between two aggregates of commodities corresponding to the distorted and non-distorted sectors:
However the reasons for the distortion are not modelled. In particular, the distortion is not an endogenous
function of quantities as it is with consumer externalities.
Characterising corrective tax rules with general interdependent preferences and ￿nding what sort of pref-
erence restrictions must be imposed if the necessary taxes are to take simple forms are still open research
issues. Kooreman & Schoonbeek (2004) analyse consumption externalities in a setting with a ￿xed income
distribution. After showing that Pareto improvements are generally possible starting from a market solution
with consumption externalities1, they consider an example in which individual preferences have the linear
expenditure form2 and the consumption externalities enter through the subsistence terms. Imposing partic-
ular assumptions (identical preferences, equal incomes, the subsistence term for commodity i depends only
on the total consumption of that commodity i by all other consumers) they compute the welfare losses due
to externalities as the deviation from an equal utility distribution Pareto optimum and then compute the
commodity taxes that will make the market solution and Pareto optimum coincide.
In this paper we explore the implications of general interdependent preferences and the theoretical prop-
erties which are required if piecemeal policy is to be possible. With general preferences, we start by showing
that a Pareto optimum corresponding to a given utility distribution can be reached through a decentralised
market system using Pigovian taxes on compensated demands with consumption externalities. We charac-
terise the system of Pigovian taxes required for this task. Then we show that a Pareto optimum corresponding
to a given income distribution can also be achieved as a market solution from Marshallian demands with
Pigovian taxes. We then show that the compensated and Marshallian approaches are equivalent which gives
us a measure of the welfare cost of the externalities de￿ned in terms of the expenditure functions of the
1So long as there is at least one good such that all individuals value the consumption of that good by each other individual
at less than its market value.
2Following up a suggestion of Pollak(1970) and Kapteyn et al (1997).
2individuals. This cost decomposes into part due to the wrong pricing of goods in the market solution, and
part due to individuals consuming the wrong quantities to implement the Pareto optimum. The equivalence
of the compensated and Marshallian approaches is also of interest because the market solution is a Nash
equilibrium in mutual best responses but the strategic interpretation of the two is di⁄erent since in one case
the individuals environment has prices and income, and in the other prices and a given utility level.
Next we try to analyse when piecemeal policy is justi￿ed and proceed by de￿ning necessary conditions on
preferences under which the individual compensated demand for any good under externalities depends only
on prices, individual utility and the consumption by other individuals of that particular good. This is the
scenario in which it most likely that simple taxes will succeed. It turns out that the externalities must enter
individual preferences and expenditure functions as a form of subsistence level/cost. In a sense the linear
expenditure type system with the form of externalities Kooreman & Schoonbeek use is one of the forms that
must prevail if piecemeal policy is to be justi￿ed.
Given this form of preferences we ￿nd further restrictions under which simple taxes will work. In particular
if externalities take the form of varying in a linear way with the total consumption of all other individuals
of each good (we call this case linear popular no spillover externalities) then when:
- Only one good has an external e⁄ect, the Pigovian taxes on any individual are identical for other goods.
However for the externality inducing good the tax on any individual depends on the relative strength
of externalities between other individuals.
- For every individual the strength of externality is equal for each good then for any pair of goods the ratio
of the tax rates of the two goods is equal for all individuals (and it is equal to the strength of the
externality on the two goods). If the social and private marginal valuations of individuals coincides
then for each good every individual faces the same Pigovian tax rate, it is as if there are speci￿c indirect
ad valorem taxes on commodities
- For each individual there is a common strength of externality for every good which di⁄ers by individual:
each individual pays the same proportional tax rate on every commodity so this is equivalent to a
proportional income tax rate.
- For every individual and every commodity there is a common strength of externality. Here the proportional
income tax rate of each individual is actually at the same rate for all individuals.
Interestingly in this case the compensated Nash equilibrium aggregate demands will also tend to satisfy
the usual Slutsky symmetry and negative semide￿niteness restrictions so that in the aggregate it may be as
3if there are synthetic consumers whose behaviour without externalities replicates aggregate demand. Finally
we illustrate the results by computing the compensated and Marshallian Pareto optima, Nash equilibria,
Pigovian taxes and the social cost of the externalities through an example with two individuals and three
commodities which is designed to show the relations between the general concepts explicitly.
The plan of the paper is to review the dual of the Pareto optimality problem without externalities (Section
3). We then use this dual formulation in the presence of consumption externalities to de￿ne the appropriate
taxes in general and then show how individuals facing these taxes interact to produce a Nash equilibrium
which is Pareto optimal. First we compute the Pigovian taxes required to ensure that the market solution
(a compensated Nash equilibrium) yields a Pareto optimum with a given utility distribution (Section 4.2).
Then we consider Pigovian taxation with interdependent preferences and ￿xed welfare weights (Section 4.3).
We establish links between the compensated and the Marshallian approach (Section 4.4). We compute the
welfare cost of the externalities (Section 4.5). Next we discuss the piecemeal policy issue (Section 5). An
example with 3 goods and 2 individuals concludes the paper.
2 The Setting
We work with H individuals indexed h; h has preferences given by uh(xh) in the absence of externalities
where xh is a consumption allocation of n commodities. With externalities we write uh(xh;x~h) where x~h
is an ordered list of the consumption allocation of all individuals other than h: We represent the resource







We can interpret this as a linear transformation locus for the economy, in this case pi represents both the
market price and average cost of the ith commodity which is in perfectly elastic supply. Alternatively it may
represent a market budget constraint for a group of H individuals, so pi is the market price for good i and y
represents the disposable resources of the group. For example the group may be a family or a team within
an organisation. In the family case we think of a family model in which the H individuals are each family
members and the family has exogenous resources y which can be allocated to purchase consumption goods
for di⁄erent family members.
3 Pareto Optimality Without Externalities
When there are no externalities, the problem of ￿nding a Pareto optimal allocation is related to the ideas
of utility possibility curves and Scitovsky community preference ￿elds Gorman (1953). Given a ￿xed utility
4distribution (u1;::uH), the Scitovsky community indi⁄erence curve is:
X(u1;::uH) = min[X1;::Xnjuh(xh) ￿ uh;
X
xh ￿ X]: (1)
giving the minimum amounts of the aggregate quantities of goods that place each individual on his prescribed
indi⁄erence curve. (Here min and max operators are understood in a vector sense). For each set of aggregate
quantities a distribution of commodities between consumers is implicitly de￿ned which just allows attainment
of the utility distribution.
De￿ne the utility possibility curve for ￿xed aggregate quantities of goods (X1;::Xm) by:
U(X1;::Xm) = max[u1;::unjUh(xh) ￿ uh;
X
xh ￿ X] (2)
The utility possibility curve indicates the maximum level of utility that an individual can achieve given the
utility level of the others.
Gorman(1953) shows that X = (X1;::Xm) 2 X(u1;::uH) i⁄ (u1;::uH) 2 U(X1;::Xm): With the linear
resource constraint (2) becomes




piXi ￿ y] (3)
Under regularity conditions3 a point u1;::uH is in U(p;y) i⁄ the group resources are just su¢ cient to reach
















where gh(p;uh) is the expenditure function of individual h: This implies that the group can decentralise the
task of attaining a particular Pareto optimal utility distribution by allocating yh of the group resources to h
and leaving h to make their own choices. From a version of Hotelling￿ s lemma we can de￿ne the aggregate
compensated demand
Fi(p;u1;::uH) = @G(p;u1;::uH)=@pi = @
X
gh(p;uh)=@pi
and so the aggregate compensated demands inherit the properties of the individual compensated demands; in
particular they have a symmetric and negative semide￿nite Jacobian with respect to p and are homogeneous
of degree zero in p:
3u(:) is continuous, strictly quasiconcave and locally nonsatiated.
54 Pareto Optimality with Externalities
4.1 With a ￿xed utility distribution





xihjuh(xh;x~h) ￿ uh;h = 1::H]










uh(xh;x~h) = uh;h ￿ 1::H (6)
where ￿
c
k is the marginal social cost of individual k: That is all marginal e⁄ects of an individuals consumption
must be taken into account so that in particular (4) is lost.
4.1.1 Implementation of a compensated Pareto optimum
If each individual were set the task of reaching a ￿xed utility level at minimum cost
min[
X

















However we could introduce individual and commodity speci￿c Pigovian taxes ￿ih so that the cost to h of a








4We continue to assume uh() is strictly quasi concave and nonsatiated in xh; and continuous in all variables.









i = 1::n ￿ 1 (11)
Uh(xh;x~h) = uh:

































































































1 @u2=@xi1=@u2=@xi2 ::: @uH=@xi1=@uH=@xiH
@u1=@xi2=@u1=@xi1 1 :::
. . .
. . . ::: ::: @uH=@xiH￿1=@uH=@xiH






This matrix will be nonsingular if at the Pareto optimal point in question the marginal externalities for
good i are independent-there is su¢ cient diversity between individuals for no one individual to be a⁄ected
by externalities in a way which is a linear combination of the external e⁄ects for other individuals.
It is evident that for each individual h; the Pigovian taxes ￿ih are only determined up to a factor of
proportionality, they serve to equate the social and private marginal rates of substitution6. Substituting




ih de￿ned by (13) then it is equivalent to solving the system of equations (5). In other
words a Nash equilibrium in which each individual faces the corrected prices, given consumption of the
other individuals and a given utility level replicates the socially optimal way of achieving the same utility
distribution.
If these taxes are used as ￿xed numbers then decentralised choice will lead to individuals choosing the
Pareto optimal consumption bundle so long as the decentralised choice problem remains well de￿ned. One
di¢ culty is that the tax could be non-positive which would make the e⁄ective market price of the good in
question negative. This could occur if xih has such a strong positive e⁄ect on the utility of other individuals
that it is e¢ cient to pay h per unit of consumption of i: But then since h is nonsatiated, there will be
no decentralised solution-h will choose an in￿nite consumption of good i: We rule this out. Apart from
6So they can be scaled to yield zero tax revenue in aggregate.
7this case, the decentralised choice problem is well behaved under Pigovian taxation given the regularity
assumptions-the ￿rst order conditions will characterise the individuals best choice.
4.2 With ￿xed welfare weights
Instead of obtaining a Pareto optimum through minimising the aggregate cost of ￿nancing the utility dis-
tribution, the Pareto optimum could be de￿ned by maximising a linear combination of individual utilities


































There are then two reasons for lack of equivalence between the Pareto optimum and the market solution.
Firstly private and social marginal rates of substitution (mrs) di⁄er so in the market solution individuals
ignore the e⁄ects of their consumption on others; secondly the income distribution may not align with the
particular welfare weights that are being used.
84.2.1 Implementation of a Marshallian Pareto optimum
If we introduced Pigovian taxes on each person and good ￿m


























































































where the ￿0s have the same de￿nition as previously. Thus the Marshallian Pigovian taxes coincide with the





In addition the income distribution must be chosen to match the welfare weights i.e. if we de￿ne the individual
utility levels achieved in the Marshallian Pareto optimum and in the market solution with Marshallian
Pigovian taxes by vPO
h (p;y;￿1;:::￿H) and vm
h (￿m ￿ p;y1;::yH) respectively then y1::yH must be chosen so
that
vPO
h (p;y;￿1;:::￿H) = vm
h (￿m ￿ p;y1;::yH) h = 1::H (21)
giving yh(￿m;p;y;￿1;:::￿H): To ensure that all resources are exactly consumed, the taxes must be scaled to
give zero tax revenue.
4.3 Equivalence between Marshallian and Compensated Nash Equilibria








9then as identities in p;uh;yh;x~h
gh(p;vh(p;yh;x~h);x~h) = yh
vh(p;gh(p;uh;x~h);x~h) = uh
Thus if yh gives a maximal utility level of uh then yh is the minimal cost incurred to reach the utility level
uh: Setting x~h to be its Nash equilibrium demand function
gh(p;vh(p;yh;XNEm
~h (p;y1::yH));XNEm
~h (p;y1::yH)) = yh = p ￿ Fh(p;y1::yH)
vh(p;gh(p;uh;XNEc
~h (p;u1:::uH));XNEc
~h (p;u1:::uH)) = uh



















From this we deduce that
(i) the Nash equilibrium demands for each good and individual in the CNE with p;k1:::kH have identical
values to the MNE demands with p and individual incomes yh set to the costs of each individual h of
purchasing the goods in the CNE (i.e. gh)
(ii) the Nash equilibrium demands for each good and individual in the MNE with p;y1:::yH have identical
values to the CNE demands with p and individual utilities uh set to the utility levels of each individual h in
the MNE
Thus for any CNE there is an associated income distribution generating a MNE which yields the utility
distribution of the CNE with identical demands for each individual and good.
From this we can deduce equivalence of the Marshallian and compensated Pareto optima since these can
be represented as Nash equilibria with Pigovian taxes. Comparing(11) and (18) the solutions will coincide
if there are suitable links between the utility distribution, the aggregate resources, the income distribution
and the welfare weights. There is a consumption allocation xih which solves (11) and attains the utility
10distribution u1:::uH at minimum aggregate cost. Setting yh = ￿ipixih the allocation xih also solves (18).
Then with y = ￿yh there are values of ￿h for which the allocation xih also solves:(15): This re￿ ects Gorman￿ s
result that the consumption allocation is in the Scitovsky community indi⁄erence curve if and only if the
utility distribution de￿ning the Scitovsky community indi⁄erence curve is attainable from that consumption











~h (￿c ￿ p;u1;::uH))
In the sequel we concentrate on the compensated demand scenario because of the equivalence between this
and the Marshallian scenario outlined above.
The Pigovian taxes are endogenous in that they depend on all quantities consumed by each individual
in the particular Pareto optimum. They vary by both commodity and individual.

















































suppose that there are no external e⁄ects in good n
@uk
@xnh


















































Second suppose that in addition good i has no external e⁄ects so that
@uk
@xih
= 0 k 6= h






so no correction is required in the ith market.
114.4 The Welfare Cost Of the Externality
We can use the framework of consumer surplus to compute the welfare cost of consumption externalities.




which in the Nash equilibrium is gh(p;uh;xNE
~h ) = e gh(p;u1;:::uH): The aggregate cost of attaining u1;:::uH








































ih (￿ihpi) ￿ xNE
ih (pi))
The welfare cost can be decomposed into part corresponding to the resource misallocation arising from the
incorrect choice of quantities and part arising from the misvaluation of commodities. In Figure 1 the two







Figure 1: Welfare cost decomposition
125 Piecemeal Policy
5.1 Compensated Nash Equilibrium with No Spillovers
Piecemeal policy involves the idea of being able to correct for market failure in one market in a way which
is independent of conditions in other markets. For example, if there is only one commodity which exhibits
externalities then piecemeal policy is possible if the Pigovian taxes in all the other markets are equal to
zero. More generally, piecemeal policy is valid if the Pigovian taxes in one market are invariant to changes
in conditions (in either preferences or prices) in other markets, or in wealth. Both these ideas involve some
notion of independence of the external e⁄ect in di⁄erent markets.
A natural place to start is to consider the case in which any individual demand for any good only
has external e⁄ects corresponding to consumption of the same good by other individuals. For example
one consumers spending on say mobile phones is only in￿ uenced by the behaviour of others through their
spending on mobile phones7. This is close to a necessary condition for piecemeal policy to be possible.
From (13) for ￿ih=￿nh to be independent of quantities consumed of goods other than i;n requires that
(@uk=@xih)=(@uk=@xik) be independent of xjk;j 6= i;n meaning that uk() in Nash equilibrium is separable
in commodities.
De￿ne externalities with no commodity spillovers to exist if each individuals compensated reaction curve




The ￿rst question is then what are the individual preferences that generate this form of compensated demand?
Since Xc














7This is impossible in the case of Marshallian demands: it would make each individuals demand for any good depend on
prices, individual income and the demand for that good by each other individual.
b xih = fih(p;yh;xi1;::xih￿1;xih+1;::xiH)
However this is inconsistent with the budget constraint; to hold for all p;Mh needs the identity
X
pifih(p;yh;xi1;::xih￿1;xih+1;::xiH) = yh
and di⁄erentiating through wrt xik implies that @fih=@xik = 0 identically or that there can actually be no externality. Essen-
tially all goods compete for consumer income.
13so that for i 6= j @Xc
ih=@pj must be independent of the externality e⁄ects xi1;::xih￿1;xih+1;::xiH because




ih(￿) = ￿ih(pi;uh;xi1;::xih￿1;xih+1;::xiH) +  ih(p;uh)




Aih(pi;uh;xi1;::xih￿1;xih+1;::xiH) + Bh(p;uh) (25)








This has the implication that in the compensated demands there are no spillovers of externalities between
commodities. We need Ai(￿) to be homogeneous of degree one in pi and so e⁄ectively it is linear in pi;and




pi e Aih(uh;xi1;::xih￿1;xih+1;::xiH) + Bh(p;uh) (27)
This has a relation to a Klein-Rubin linear expenditure system of preferences; in fact it extends this by
allowing the subsistence level to vary with the standard of living of the consumer uh: Interestingly Pollak
(1976), Kapteyn et al (1997) and Kooreman & Schoonbeek (2004) focus on interdependence in the Klein-
Rubin utility function, interpreting the subsistence parameter as a linear function of the quantities consumed
by other individuals.
5.1.1 The Linear No Spillover Case
A special form of (27) makes the externalities work only through a linear combination of the consumption
of others (Kapteyn et al (1997)).















Note that Bh() itself can be interpreted as an expenditure function: it must be concave and homogeneous







14The strength of the external e⁄ect is independent of prices and of the standard of living.
A further specialisation arises if h0s preferences react only to the total consumption of others of each
good and in a way that is independent of the standard of living. Empirically examples would be congestion
goods (public transport) and network goods (mobile telephones). In this case when marginal external e⁄ects
are constants, ￿ih; individual preferences have the form















so it is the total consumption of others which a⁄ects an individual￿ s compensated demand. We call this
linear popular no spillover externalities. Kooreman & Schoonbeek use a linear expenditure system which
has this form.











































1 wi21 ::: wiH1
wi12 1 .






The e⁄ect of linearity of externalities is that [￿i
hk] is independent of prices or the level of individual income






1 ￿i2 ::: ￿iH
￿i1 1 .













(￿ik ￿ 1)=det(A) (30)
For each commodity-person, the tax factors into a product of a person speci￿c term, common to all com-
modities, and a person-commodity speci￿c term. The person speci￿c tax (pn=(￿
c
h@uh=@xnh)) re￿ ects the
di⁄erence between the market and social marginal valuations of individual h at the Pareto optimum as
15measured through the marginal utilities of the last good. The commodity speci￿c part depends only on the
strength of the various externalities ￿ih and it is independent of prices or the level of utility. This is due to
the linearity of the externality e⁄ect. Moreover for any commodity the ratio of the Pigovain taxes on any










so there is an independence of irrelevant externalities property8. Restricted types of popular externalities
will generate commonly observed taxation regimes, for example a personal income tax system or a system
of speci￿c indirect commodity taxes. In particular if
- Only good 1 has an external e⁄ect (￿ih = 0; i > 1)
The Pigovian taxes on any individual are identical for goods i > 2, however for good 1 the tax on
individual h depends on the relative strength of externalities between other individuals.
- For every individual the strength of externality is equal for each good (￿ih = ￿i)
For any pair of goods the ratio of the tax rates of the two goods is equal for all individuals (and it is
equal to the strength of the externality on the two goods). If the social and private marginal valuations of
individuals coincide then for each good every individual faces the same tax rate, it is as if there are speci￿c
indirect ad valorem taxes on commodities
- For each individual there is a common strength of externality for every good (￿ih = ￿h)
Each individual pays the same proportional tax rate on every commodity so this is equivalent to a
proportional income tax rate.
- For every individual and every commodity there is a common strength of externality (￿ih = ￿)
The proportional income tax rate of each individual is actually at the same rate for all individuals.
The Compensated Nash Equilibrium The compensated reaction curves (28) can be solved commodity

























































(31) is of special interest since each term Bh(p;uh) has all the properties of an expenditure function. In





the Jacobian of the aggregate compensated Nash equilibrium demands will also satisfy the sign restrictions of
negative semide￿niteness. Note that the aggregate demand may fail to have a negative semide￿nite Jacobian
if some or all of the coe¢ cients ￿hk are negative. The aggregate compensated Nash equilibrium demand


















A clear case when this holds is if ￿ih = ￿h for all i: the case of common externality e⁄ects across commodities.
Then we can think of these aggregate demands as coming from H synthetic consumers where the kth














6 A 3 Commodity, 2 Individual Example
6.1 The utilities




￿ih log(xih + ￿ihxik);k 6= h;
3 X
i=1
￿ih = 1 (33)










9Detailed calculations are available on request.
176.2 Demands in a Compensated Pareto Optimum










































































































6.3 Compensated Demands in a Nash Equilibrium
























6.4 Compensated Pigovian Prices
Applying equation (13) the Pigovian taxes are given by
￿c
ih =
(1 ￿ ￿ik)(1 ￿ ￿3h￿3k)
(1 ￿ ￿ih￿ik)(1 ￿ ￿3k)
;￿c
3h = 1 (38)
for each h 6= k: The terms in good 3 represent the e⁄ects of the marginal valuation of the individual for good
n. For positive Pigovian prices we require either 0 ￿ ￿ik < 1 for all i;k or ￿ik > 1 for all i;k:
6.5 Compensated Demands with Pigovian Pricing
Replacing the prices pi in (38) with the tax corrected prices ￿c


































18Putting (38) in (39) we get the Pareto optimal demand stated in (36) so these price corrections do eliminate
the market failure.





6.6 Demands in a Marshallian Pareto Optimum
For given aggregate resources y and with a welfare weights ￿;1 ￿ ￿ respectively for individuals 1 and 2 the



































which de￿nes the income distribution necessary to sustain the Pareto optimum in markets. Note that the
sum of these is equal to y:
6.7 Marshallian Demands in a Nash Equilibrium with Fixed Income Distribu-
tion
We derive these from the more general equations (41) below where all ￿m
ih = 1:
6.8 Marshallian Pigovian Prices
Using (20) these are given by
￿m
ih =
(1 ￿ ￿ik)(1 ￿ ￿3h￿3k)
(1 ￿ ￿ih￿ik)(1 ￿ ￿3k)
(40)
Notice that the Marshallian Pigovian prices are equal to the compensated Pigovian prices.
6.9 Marshallian Demands in a Nash Equilibrium with Fixed Income Distribu-
tion and Pigovian Pricing
The Marshallian Nash equilibrium demands with Pigovian pricing have the form
xNEm
1h = [(yk+￿2kyh)￿1hA1k￿(￿2hyk+yh)A1h￿(yk+￿3kyh)￿1hA2k+(￿3hyk+yh)A2h+A3yh]=(p1D) (41)
xNEm
2h = [(￿1kyh + yk)￿2hA1h ￿ (yh + ￿1hyk)A1k ￿ (yh + ￿3hyk)A4h ￿ (￿3kyh + yk)￿2hA4k + A5yh]=(p2D)
xNEm
3h = [(￿1hyk + yh)A2k ￿ ￿3h(yk + ￿1kyh)A2h ￿ (yk + ￿2kyh)￿3hA4h + (￿2hyk + yh)A4k + A6yh]=(p3D)
19where for h 6= k;h;k = 1;2
A1h = ￿￿1h￿2k(1 ￿ ￿3h￿3k)￿M
1k￿M
2h








A3 = ￿1h￿1k(1 ￿ ￿2h￿2k)(1 ￿ ￿3h￿3k)￿M
2k￿M
2h
A5 = ￿2h￿2k(1 ￿ ￿1h￿1k)(1 ￿ ￿3h￿3k)￿M
1k￿M
1h






D = (1 ￿ ￿22￿21)(1 ￿ ￿11￿12)￿32￿31
+￿11(1 ￿ ￿22￿21)(1 ￿ ￿12￿31)￿31￿m
12 + ￿12(1 ￿ ￿22￿21)(1 ￿ ￿11￿32)￿31￿m
11 +
￿11￿12(1 ￿ ￿22￿21)(1 ￿ ￿31￿32)￿m
21 + ￿21(1 ￿ ￿11￿12)(1 ￿ ￿31￿22)￿32￿m
11￿m
12 +
￿12￿21(1 ￿ ￿11￿12)(1 ￿ ￿31￿32)￿m
11￿m
12 + ￿22(1 ￿ ￿11￿12)(1 ￿ ￿32￿21)￿31￿m
11 +
￿22￿21(1 ￿ ￿21￿12)(1 ￿ ￿31￿32)￿m
21￿m
12 + ￿22￿21(1 ￿ ￿11￿12)(1 ￿ ￿32￿31)￿m
11￿m
12)
To see the equivalence between these demands and those in a Pareto optimum for given aggregate resources
y and relative welfare weights ￿ on the two individuals, de￿ne individual incomes by the expenditure of each





































Substitute these into the Marshallian Nash equilibrium demands with Pigovian pricing to get
xNEm
ih = Xih(￿ ￿ p;y;y￿h)






20Detailed calculation shows that




(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3(￿1 + ￿22)(￿21 ￿ 1)(￿11(￿11 ￿ 1) + ￿12￿11(￿12 ￿ 1))
(￿32 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿22￿21)(￿31 ￿ 1)
A12 = ￿
(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3(￿1 + ￿22)(￿21 ￿ 1)(￿12(￿12 ￿ 1) + ￿11￿12(￿11 ￿ 1))
(￿32 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿22￿21)(￿31 ￿ 1)
A21 =
(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3(1 ￿ ￿12)(￿11 ￿ 1)(￿21(￿21 ￿ 1) + ￿22￿21(￿22 ￿ 1))
(￿32 ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿22￿21)(￿31 ￿ 1)
A22 = ￿
(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3(￿1 + ￿12)(￿11 ￿ 1)(￿22(￿22 ￿ 1) + ￿21￿22(￿21 ￿ 1))
(￿32 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿22￿21)(￿31 ￿ 1)
A31 = ￿
(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3((1 ￿ ￿32￿31)￿31 + ￿31(￿21 + ￿11 ￿ ￿12 ￿ ￿22))(1 ￿ ￿22)(￿21 ￿ 1)(￿12 ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿11)
(1 ￿ ￿11￿12)(￿32 ￿ 1)2(1 ￿ ￿22￿21)(￿31 ￿ 1)2
A32 =
(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3((1 ￿ ￿32￿31)￿32 + ￿32(￿12 + ￿22 ￿ ￿21 ￿ ￿11))(1 ￿ ￿22)(￿21 ￿ 1)(￿12 ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿11)




























The functions Bih are dependent on ￿ and ￿ and do not justify the space to display here10. The ratio
Y=D is relatively simple:
Y=D = ￿
(￿32 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿11￿12)(￿31 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿22￿21)
(￿32￿31 ￿ 1)3(￿21 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿22)(￿12 ￿ 1)(￿1 + ￿11)
so that Nihy￿=D reduces to the coe¢ cient of ￿y in Marshallian Pareto optimal demand. It is more tedious
to show that the coe¢ cient Nihy=D also reduces to the coe¢ cient of y in the Marshallian Pareto optimal
demand but in fact it does.
6.10 Equivalence of the Compensated and Marshallian Pareto optimum
Here we show that for any CPO with a utility distribution k1;k2 there is an aggregate resource level and
welfare weights in which the Marshallian Pareto optimal demands coincide with the compensated Pareto
optimal demands.
10Details are available on request.
21Given a compensated Pareto optimum we can compute the aggregate resources that it requires by sum-



















;k 6= h (43)
Notice that without externalities the feasible utility distribution from given income y that makes say u1 is
maximal gives 1 all the aggregate income y and 2 has nothing. But with externalities this may not be true-1
may be better o⁄ from 2 having some of the income if there are positive externalities.In the Marshallian
demands at the Pareto optimum corresponding to y;￿; replace y by the expression (43) and then take the





























which has the interpretation of the share of the total cost of attaining the Pareto optimum attributable to
individual 1:
With these values of y and ￿; xPOc
ih = xPOm
ih for each pair of values i;h:
6.11 Social Cost
The social cost of the externality SC is the sum of losses incurred by each individual, in turn the individual
losses are the sum of the losses on each commodity which depend on the strength of preference for the

































In this paper we use the ideas of a utility possibility curve and a Scitovsky community indi⁄erence curve to
implement a Pareto optimum when there are consumption externalities. We use the long established idea
of Pigovian taxation to analyse this, focussing on situations in which piecemeal policy is possible in the
sense that corrective tax policy in one market is largely independent of tax policy in other markets. We
show that for this to be possible individual preferences must have a form in which the externality enters
as an adjustment to a subsistence term in individual utility or cost. This is interesting since for other
reasons the literature has suggested modelling interdependent preferences in this way. We show that if the
22externality has this form and also enters only through the sum of the consumption of other individuals
and linearly then various simple tax systems can be used to correct for the externalities. In particular
the correct taxes on one good can be computed independently of other goods, and for cases where there is
further restriction on the form of the externality (especially across individuals or across goods) the commonly
used taxes such as speci￿c excise taxes or a personal income tax can implement a Pareto optimum. This
provides a justi￿cation for concentrating on these forms of preferences, of course the other justi￿cation is
empirical-such preferences are likely to arise with network of congestion goods. Our results generalise those
in the literature on characterising Pigovian taxes and provide the link to piecemeal policy. We also give a
decomposition of the welfare cost of externalities. On the positive economics side we ￿nd conditions under
which the market solution for compensated demands (which has the form of a Nash equilibrium due to the
consumption interdependence) will either be downward sloping or have a symmetric Jacobian with respect
to prices. Finally we examine a two individual, three commodity example to see how the taxes look and the
features of the welfare cost of the externalities.
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1@u1=@xn1 ::: ::: 0
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1@u1=@xn1 ::: ::: 0






























































































1h are the elements of the inverse of the matrix of marginal externality e⁄ects with 10s on the diagonal.

























for any k (A4)














































































































































￿1@u1=@xn1 ::: ::: 0












































































e1 1 ::: 1









We assert that the inverse of A is C :
cij = ￿￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1)=det(B) i 6= j (44)
cjj = ￿eicij ￿ ￿k6=i;jckj
= [ei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + ￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B) for any i 6= j; each j (45)
det(B) = ejcjj + ￿i6=jcij for any j
= (ejei ￿ 1)￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + (ej ￿ 1)￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)






e1c11 + ￿k6=1ck1 e1c12 + ￿k6=1ck2 ::: e1c1H + ￿k6=1ckH









A typical o⁄ diagonal term of BC has the form
eicij + ￿k6=ickj
= eicij + ￿k6=i;jckj + cjj
= ￿ei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1)=det(B) ￿ ￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)=det(B) + [ei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + ￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= 0
whilst a typical diagonal term has the form
ejcjj + ￿k6=jckj
= ej [ei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + ￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B) ￿ ￿k6=j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)=det(B)
= [ejei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + ej￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1) ￿ ￿k6=j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [ejei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + ej￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1) ￿ ￿k6=j;i￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1) ￿ ￿l6=i;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [ejei￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + (ej ￿ 1)￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1) ￿ ￿l6=i;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [(ejei ￿ 1)￿k6=i;j(ek ￿ 1) + (ej ￿ 1)￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j(el ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= 1
27Hence the inverse of B is indeed given by C:





1 ￿2 ::: ￿H
￿1 1 .









1=￿1 1 ::: 1













￿1 0 ::: 0















￿1 0 ::: 0














￿1 0 ::: 0
















1=￿1 1 ::: 1



























￿(1=￿i)￿k6=i;j((￿k ￿ 1)=￿k ￿ ￿k6=i;j￿l6=k;j((￿l ￿ 1=￿l)
￿j det(B)












To evaluate [cii + ￿k6=icik]=￿i consider
cii + ￿k6=icik = ￿ekcki ￿ ￿l6=k;icli + ￿l6=icil
= [ek￿l6=k;i(el ￿ 1) + ￿l6=k;i￿j6=l;i(ej ￿ 1) ￿ ￿l6=i￿j6=l;i(ej ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [ek￿l6=k;i(el ￿ 1) + ￿l6=k;i￿j6=l;i(ej ￿ 1) ￿ ￿l6=i;k￿j6=l;i(ej ￿ 1) ￿ ￿j6=k;i(ej ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [ek￿j6=k;i(ej ￿ 1) + ￿l6=k;i￿j6=l;i(ej ￿ 1) ￿ ￿l6=i;k￿j6=l;i(ej ￿ 1) ￿ ￿j6=k;i(ej ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [(ek ￿ 1)￿j6=k;i(ej ￿ 1)]=det(B)
= [￿j6=i(ej ￿ 1)]=det(B)
28Replacing ej by 1=￿j
[cii + ￿k6=icik]=￿i = ￿j6=i(
￿j ￿ 1
￿j
)=(￿i det(B))
=
￿j6=i(￿j ￿ 1)
det(A)
29